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• 1200	buildings
• 659	kilometres	of	sewer	
pipes
• 69kms	of	water	mains
Infrastructure	damage
Government	decides	to	rebuild	infrastructure	with	a	
District	Energy	Scheme
Research	Questions.
• Why	did	the	Government	choose	a	District	Energy	Scheme	(DES)	for	
the	rebuilding	of	Christchurch’s	infrastructure?
• Why	was	no	feasibility	study	carried	out?
• Why	did	the	Government	ignore	recommendations	by	consultants?
• Was	the	scheme	likely	to	work?
• Why	did	the	Government	give	the	money	away	to	the	economic	elite	
in	Christchurch	when	the	scheme	failed?
• Why	did	the	Government	not	adequately	help	householders?
• Why	did	it	end	in	failure	costing	millions	of	$$$$?
Research	methods:
Politicians	and	decision	makers	have		buried	the	evidence	so	the	
research	involved:
• Local	media	and		reports	as	events	occurred
• Consultant’s	and	academic	reports.	
• Interviews	with	Government	ministers	and	local	government	
officers.
• Freedom	of	Information	Act	to	obtain	unpublished	material.	
TIMELINE
September	2010.	 7.1	Earthquake,		2	people	injured
February	2011		 6.3	Earthquake,		183	people	killed
March	2011	 Government	takes	political	control	away	from	City	Council	
March	2011 Government	decides	to	implement	a	District	Energy	Scheme
April/May	2011	 Information	Report	(BECA)	to	justify	DES	(no	feasibility	study	was	
ever	carried	out).	Recommended	further	investigation	into	fuel	costs.
May	2011 Local	Council	initiates	public	participation	through	“Share	an	idea”.	
Government	ignores	this.
Jan	2012	 Technical	feasibility	study	(Aurecon).	Recommended	further	
investigation	into	fuel	costs.	Government	ignores	recommendations
TIMELINE
Feb	2013	 “Government	junked	the	green	values”	of	Share	and	Idea
Sept	2013	 Bioenergy	Assoc of	NZ	reports	that	costs	of	fuel	would	be	2	
to	3	times	more	than	estimated	in	Aurecon	study
July	2015 Hospital	backs	out	of	DES	and	decides	to	use	coal	instead
July	2015	 Energy	grant	scheme	introduced	by	a	publicly	funded	
charitable	Trust.
Feb	2016	 The	first	grant	was	given	to	“one	of	the	richest	men	in	
Christchurch”.	No	grants	given	to	households.	1	hour	free	
advice	only
2016	 DES	described	as	“total	failure”
Technical	problems	of	a	DES
1.	No	experience	of	DES	in	NZ.	Urban	areas	
very	dispersed	and	over	75%	of	electricity	
from	renewable	resources.
2.	DES	would	be	constructed	of	underground	
steel	pipes.	These	would	not	withstand	
earthquakes	encountered	in	Christchurch.	659	
kilometres	of	sewer	pipes	and	69kms	of	water	
mains	damaged	due	to	the	earthquake
3.	Inadequate	biofuel	for	boilers	(because	of	
deforestation	of	land	given	to	dairy	farming).	
Only	other	(cheaper)	alternative	is	coal.	
Governance	issues
1.	Decision	for	a	DES	made	without	any	form	of	feasibility	study.	Still	
unknown	why	and	how	it	was	promoted	as	the	flagship	piece	of	
infrastructure	in	Christchurch.
2.	NZ	Government	not	prepared	to	increase	building	insulation	
standards	(some	of	the	lowest	standards	in	the	OECD)	although	the	
Christchurch	City	Council,	Green	Building	Council	recommended	this.
3.	Government	did	not	offer	householders	advice	or	support	in	
improving	household	thermal	performance.
4.	When	public	money	was	not	spent	on	the	DES,	it	was	given	away	to	
wealthy	developers	for	schemes/technologies	that	are	already	well	
established.
